“I was angry because she was raped, that’s one thing,” Duterte said. “But she was so beautiful, the mayor should have been first. What a waste.”
“Hitler massacred three million Jews ... there’s three million drug addicts. There are. I’d be happy to slaughter them.”
Rodrigo Duterte is a polarizing figure. Or he should be. One that has promised to eradicate the trade and use of illegal drugs, end criminality and corruption in six months; and within the same breath, joke about the rape of an Australian missionary, call the Pope “a son of a whore” in a country with 86% of its population being Roman Catholics.
Yet, political polarization does not exist within the Philippines, as Duterte continues to enjoy a 91% approval rate, according to a September 2020 Pulse Asia survey (Kenny, 2020).
Distrust in liberal democracy and Duterte’s authenticity
The poor have long been ignored, with the deck stacked against them through every stage of life. When the imperial west made its departure from the Philippines, the socio-economic power previously held by the colonists simply shifted to local elites. Since then, political dynasties and oligarchs have continued to dominate the country’s local and national elections. Ben Kerkvliet, an ethnographer, describes the trajectory that have occurred in local politics, in which “violence, intimidation, monetary inducements” have historically been deployed by Filipino elites in order “to manipulate formal democratic procedures to their liking” (Curato, 2018). Thus, vernacular forms of political policies that correspond with the country’s culture rather than of those in the West tend to succeed more amongst the non-elite; politicians who can sympathize and ‘claim solidarity’ with the struggles of ordinary Filipinos (Claudio, 2017).
Duterte, emerged as a figure of hope, for those who have been continually dismissed and undermined by the system. He is considered a populist by many, a campaign characterized by targeting an urgent issue in the nation, in Duterte’s case being drug addicts, and one that pushes to revolt against an established elite, like the Philippine Liberal Party (Uyheng, 2021). He has deployed a “rough-talking” rhetoric and a “strong-man” rule to capitalize on the poor’s disillusionment, particularly with the previous presidency of Benigno S. Aquino III who exemplified the flawed political structure of the country and embodied the “elite” that Duterte was determined to replace; a reformist president who was part of the wealthy and political dynasty of the Aquino clan. Voters saw Duterte as a “cure” to these political dynasties, with his own local oligarchic background ignored (Claudio, 2017).
His populism taps into “latent anxieties” shared by the poor, defined “as a sense of discomfort that is present but not central, mundane but still worrisome, publicized but not politicized.” (Curato, 2018). Duterte successfully appeals to these “latent anxieties” through his anti - drug campaign, with 93% of respondents supporting the campaign in a December 2019 poll, even when 79% agreed, in another survey, that extrajudicial killings were happening (Kenny, 2020).
Marites, a mother who suffered the loss of her house during a storm and who worked long hours to build it back, shared her fears. She was scared for her thirteen-year-old son, and the influence of the other teenage boys in her neighborhood, who sold crystal methamphetamine. If he becomes involved, what will happen then of his future? Another story features a wife whose husband got high and smashed her jaw (Curato, 2018). Stories like this populate the vernacular conversations surrounding drug use in rural areas. Innocent bystanders who are constantly threatened not only by the wealthy, but also their surrounding neighborhood “troublemakers”. Thus, ordinary, working-class Filipinos argue that the war on drugs have resulted to safer neighborhoods, a problem that was only intimately felt by those outside of the elites, eradicated by a paternal figure in Duterte. Whilst previous politicians have attempted to legitimize these concerns by offering reformist and technocratic solutions like a rehabilitation program, it fails to appease the frustrations of a public “who feel that they have been patiently waiting for their break for a better life, only to be taken over by unscrupulous others” (Curato, 2018). Whereas Duterte was able to legitimize these concerns by offering a quick solution formed on the basis of retribution – he was able to listen and act on the concerns of ordinary Filipinos the way they wanted to.
Duterte also performs “authenticity” impressively. He is often commended for being “real”, making statements that depart from the political norms: from his rape jokes to cursing the pope; he doesn’t voice his compassion for the poor, promising a better life, instead he acts on their concerns by promising to dump the dead bodies of drug addicts in Manila Bay; he attends political debates in everyday clothing, boasting about his sexual exploits as a city mayor. He talks, acts, and looks like an ordinary Filipino. Jessica Zafra describes him as the Filipino ID. The impulsive component of our psyche that lacks regard for any consequences. “Duterte’s words are not calculated to impress the voters. He’s just saying words that are already in your head.” (Zafra, 2016). Duterte is a media-savvy politician able to deflect any blame on him onto others. A great example of this is the murder committed by the police of Kian Delos Santos, an unarmed seventeen-year-old, shot in August 2017 during an anti-drug raid. Duterte placed the blame on the police officers, framing it as an isolated case of an abuse of power by individual police members rather than a systematic problem. Delos Santos’ parents even posed for a picture with Duterte – thus publicly absolving the president of any guilt or involvement in the murder of their son.
Elitism within liberals
Outside of oligarchies, there is also a smugness present in those who follow liberal and progressive ideologies in the country. The departure of the West has had long lasting consequences in the Philippines, it has led to a division that continues to populate online discourse in the country. The country’s upper classes who have access to formal education and media, not limited to the Philippines, have been ‘systematically socialized’ into beliefs that align with Western ideals (Uyheng, 2021). Cosmopolitan values that focus on institutions such as human rights and the democracy of a country. Rocco, a Filipino resident, argues that extrajudicial killings are harming the integrity of the Philippine constitution, he says, “You are not a criminal until proven so in a court of law.” Whilst this argument is valid, he then describes these working-class Filipinos as “en-masse”, people who simply “just cannot understand.” (Uyheng, 2021). We must look beyond the belief that working-class Filipinos simply don’t care about human rights or the country. It’s just not at the top of their priorities, especially with a problem that they feel impedes and continues to disproportionately threaten them and their children.
Another example of this smugness is present in the people who are quick to dismiss illiberal voters, in this case those who voted for Duterte, as “bobotante”, a Filipino term that combines the word “bobo” and “botante” together, forming the word “dumb voter”. The term is used to accuse the masses as “enablers of ineffective leadership… of selling their votes and picking gyrating celebrities over candidates with clear platforms.” (Regalado, 2021). A Quora poster, echoed by many in the thread, also described Duterte’s supporters as “mentally challenged”, people who we “shouldn’t take seriously.” (Oliveros, 2017).
However, condescension does nothing to further a conversation; how can you generate a genuine, constructive discussion if you’ve prematurely dismissed the person as “less than”. Like the reply in the Quora thread, we must become sensitive to the different plights that people face within the country. Before we call out the futility of the drug war, we must consider the ways some people are affected, and the ways we are not. There is a stark contrast in living in an air-conditioned room, studying the politics and appeal of Duterte and a mother who has lost everything and is scared to lose her young son to drugs too. Vernacular arguments are based on the personal fears of citizens, difficulties that they encounter every day, compared to cosmopolitan values like human rights (Uyheng, 2021). Sociologist, Prince Adama expands on this and explains that “as long as the masses are forced to solve everyday problems like hunger on their own, it will be difficult to ask them to think about the country's future.” (Regalado, 2021).
Liberals in the Philippines also undermine the role of emotions that play into people’s choices. Rational politics, based on logic and scientific reasoning alone, can only go so far, particularly in a country that suffers from deep wealth and educational inequalities. These liberal solutions are often detached from the realities of the people it is trying to cater and serve and dismisses the role of tradition and culture that play into how people vote (Regalado, 2021). “All kinds of things,” Sophia Rosenfeld explains, “are built into what looks like a fact,” such as values, cultural norms, and desires (Nolasco, 2019). This phenomenon explains Duterte’s appeal. Whilst domestic and international criticisms have decried his platform as fascist, illogical, backward, and inhumane, he has also been credited as the country’s serving “paternal figure”, the “walking, talking id” of Filipinos, a connection formed with ordinary citizens based on kinship and gratitude. (Nolasco, 2019).
Some will argue that western liberalism simply does not fit in the Philippines - post-colonial experts have described the ideology as simply a ‘handmaiden’ of colonialism. Duterte himself has spread this rhetoric when his office accused the UN of imposing “liberal Western values” on “an Asian nation that places premium on common good,” concluding that it has “display[ed] a lack of appreciation for the diversity of global culture.” However, liberal thought has always been practiced in the country going as far back to the 1890’s when the national hero of the Philippines, Jose Rizal, fought for liberation from the Spanish rule. Rizal believed in Enlightenment, advocating for social progress, tolerance, scientific knowledge and separation of church and state (Sicat, 2019). He even criticized the Spanish liberals and argued that if they had “more faith in their ideals”, the “modern ideas” of Catholics missionaries would not “be asphyxiated upon touching the shores of Manila.” (Claudio, 2017).
The country has continuously swung from autocratic to reformist leaders. The downfall of Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship in 1986 was spearheaded by a revolution of the people. A bloodless demonstration, in which thousands of Filipinos gathered on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue for three days to protest the late president, Marcos and concluded that enough was enough. But we must do well to remember that these are the same Filipinos who voted Duterte to the highest office of the land. To move forward, we must acknowledge these contradictions and not infantilize the masses but instead recognize their decisions to be active rather than passive. Liberals must find a way to incorporate these ‘irrationalities’; to embrace the role of culture and emotions in politics, as to abandon them will result to the exploitation of others ‘for their politically nefarious ends.’ (Nolasco, 2019.) In the age of social media, where the act of listening has long been abandoned and we are so focused on being right, we must not forget the importance of questioning and introspection. Our thoughts cannot simply exist in an echo chamber, but rather we must engage with the concerns and worries of other people in better hopes of understanding them. We must seek to understand before we could be understood (Acidre, 2020). We must quit the celebration of being ‘woke’ and ‘enlightened’ and, instead redirect our focus on empowering the people.
After all, we all just want to be seen.
“Hitler massacred three million Jews ... there’s three million drug addicts. There are. I’d be happy to slaughter them.”
Rodrigo Duterte is a polarizing figure. Or he should be. One that has promised to eradicate the trade and use of illegal drugs, end criminality and corruption in six months; and within the same breath, joke about the rape of an Australian missionary, call the Pope “a son of a whore” in a country with 86% of its population being Roman Catholics.
Yet, political polarization does not exist within the Philippines, as Duterte continues to enjoy a 91% approval rate, according to a September 2020 Pulse Asia survey (Kenny, 2020).
Distrust in liberal democracy and Duterte’s authenticity
The poor have long been ignored, with the deck stacked against them through every stage of life. When the imperial west made its departure from the Philippines, the socio-economic power previously held by the colonists simply shifted to local elites. Since then, political dynasties and oligarchs have continued to dominate the country’s local and national elections. Ben Kerkvliet, an ethnographer, describes the trajectory that have occurred in local politics, in which “violence, intimidation, monetary inducements” have historically been deployed by Filipino elites in order “to manipulate formal democratic procedures to their liking” (Curato, 2018). Thus, vernacular forms of political policies that correspond with the country’s culture rather than of those in the West tend to succeed more amongst the non-elite; politicians who can sympathize and ‘claim solidarity’ with the struggles of ordinary Filipinos (Claudio, 2017).
Duterte, emerged as a figure of hope, for those who have been continually dismissed and undermined by the system. He is considered a populist by many, a campaign characterized by targeting an urgent issue in the nation, in Duterte’s case being drug addicts, and one that pushes to revolt against an established elite, like the Philippine Liberal Party (Uyheng, 2021). He has deployed a “rough-talking” rhetoric and a “strong-man” rule to capitalize on the poor’s disillusionment, particularly with the previous presidency of Benigno S. Aquino III who exemplified the flawed political structure of the country and embodied the “elite” that Duterte was determined to replace; a reformist president who was part of the wealthy and political dynasty of the Aquino clan. Voters saw Duterte as a “cure” to these political dynasties, with his own local oligarchic background ignored (Claudio, 2017).
His populism taps into “latent anxieties” shared by the poor, defined “as a sense of discomfort that is present but not central, mundane but still worrisome, publicized but not politicized.” (Curato, 2018). Duterte successfully appeals to these “latent anxieties” through his anti - drug campaign, with 93% of respondents supporting the campaign in a December 2019 poll, even when 79% agreed, in another survey, that extrajudicial killings were happening (Kenny, 2020).
Marites, a mother who suffered the loss of her house during a storm and who worked long hours to build it back, shared her fears. She was scared for her thirteen-year-old son, and the influence of the other teenage boys in her neighborhood, who sold crystal methamphetamine. If he becomes involved, what will happen then of his future? Another story features a wife whose husband got high and smashed her jaw (Curato, 2018). Stories like this populate the vernacular conversations surrounding drug use in rural areas. Innocent bystanders who are constantly threatened not only by the wealthy, but also their surrounding neighborhood “troublemakers”. Thus, ordinary, working-class Filipinos argue that the war on drugs have resulted to safer neighborhoods, a problem that was only intimately felt by those outside of the elites, eradicated by a paternal figure in Duterte. Whilst previous politicians have attempted to legitimize these concerns by offering reformist and technocratic solutions like a rehabilitation program, it fails to appease the frustrations of a public “who feel that they have been patiently waiting for their break for a better life, only to be taken over by unscrupulous others” (Curato, 2018). Whereas Duterte was able to legitimize these concerns by offering a quick solution formed on the basis of retribution – he was able to listen and act on the concerns of ordinary Filipinos the way they wanted to.
Duterte also performs “authenticity” impressively. He is often commended for being “real”, making statements that depart from the political norms: from his rape jokes to cursing the pope; he doesn’t voice his compassion for the poor, promising a better life, instead he acts on their concerns by promising to dump the dead bodies of drug addicts in Manila Bay; he attends political debates in everyday clothing, boasting about his sexual exploits as a city mayor. He talks, acts, and looks like an ordinary Filipino. Jessica Zafra describes him as the Filipino ID. The impulsive component of our psyche that lacks regard for any consequences. “Duterte’s words are not calculated to impress the voters. He’s just saying words that are already in your head.” (Zafra, 2016). Duterte is a media-savvy politician able to deflect any blame on him onto others. A great example of this is the murder committed by the police of Kian Delos Santos, an unarmed seventeen-year-old, shot in August 2017 during an anti-drug raid. Duterte placed the blame on the police officers, framing it as an isolated case of an abuse of power by individual police members rather than a systematic problem. Delos Santos’ parents even posed for a picture with Duterte – thus publicly absolving the president of any guilt or involvement in the murder of their son.
Elitism within liberals
Outside of oligarchies, there is also a smugness present in those who follow liberal and progressive ideologies in the country. The departure of the West has had long lasting consequences in the Philippines, it has led to a division that continues to populate online discourse in the country. The country’s upper classes who have access to formal education and media, not limited to the Philippines, have been ‘systematically socialized’ into beliefs that align with Western ideals (Uyheng, 2021). Cosmopolitan values that focus on institutions such as human rights and the democracy of a country. Rocco, a Filipino resident, argues that extrajudicial killings are harming the integrity of the Philippine constitution, he says, “You are not a criminal until proven so in a court of law.” Whilst this argument is valid, he then describes these working-class Filipinos as “en-masse”, people who simply “just cannot understand.” (Uyheng, 2021). We must look beyond the belief that working-class Filipinos simply don’t care about human rights or the country. It’s just not at the top of their priorities, especially with a problem that they feel impedes and continues to disproportionately threaten them and their children.
Another example of this smugness is present in the people who are quick to dismiss illiberal voters, in this case those who voted for Duterte, as “bobotante”, a Filipino term that combines the word “bobo” and “botante” together, forming the word “dumb voter”. The term is used to accuse the masses as “enablers of ineffective leadership… of selling their votes and picking gyrating celebrities over candidates with clear platforms.” (Regalado, 2021). A Quora poster, echoed by many in the thread, also described Duterte’s supporters as “mentally challenged”, people who we “shouldn’t take seriously.” (Oliveros, 2017).
However, condescension does nothing to further a conversation; how can you generate a genuine, constructive discussion if you’ve prematurely dismissed the person as “less than”. Like the reply in the Quora thread, we must become sensitive to the different plights that people face within the country. Before we call out the futility of the drug war, we must consider the ways some people are affected, and the ways we are not. There is a stark contrast in living in an air-conditioned room, studying the politics and appeal of Duterte and a mother who has lost everything and is scared to lose her young son to drugs too. Vernacular arguments are based on the personal fears of citizens, difficulties that they encounter every day, compared to cosmopolitan values like human rights (Uyheng, 2021). Sociologist, Prince Adama expands on this and explains that “as long as the masses are forced to solve everyday problems like hunger on their own, it will be difficult to ask them to think about the country's future.” (Regalado, 2021).
Liberals in the Philippines also undermine the role of emotions that play into people’s choices. Rational politics, based on logic and scientific reasoning alone, can only go so far, particularly in a country that suffers from deep wealth and educational inequalities. These liberal solutions are often detached from the realities of the people it is trying to cater and serve and dismisses the role of tradition and culture that play into how people vote (Regalado, 2021). “All kinds of things,” Sophia Rosenfeld explains, “are built into what looks like a fact,” such as values, cultural norms, and desires (Nolasco, 2019). This phenomenon explains Duterte’s appeal. Whilst domestic and international criticisms have decried his platform as fascist, illogical, backward, and inhumane, he has also been credited as the country’s serving “paternal figure”, the “walking, talking id” of Filipinos, a connection formed with ordinary citizens based on kinship and gratitude. (Nolasco, 2019).
Some will argue that western liberalism simply does not fit in the Philippines - post-colonial experts have described the ideology as simply a ‘handmaiden’ of colonialism. Duterte himself has spread this rhetoric when his office accused the UN of imposing “liberal Western values” on “an Asian nation that places premium on common good,” concluding that it has “display[ed] a lack of appreciation for the diversity of global culture.” However, liberal thought has always been practiced in the country going as far back to the 1890’s when the national hero of the Philippines, Jose Rizal, fought for liberation from the Spanish rule. Rizal believed in Enlightenment, advocating for social progress, tolerance, scientific knowledge and separation of church and state (Sicat, 2019). He even criticized the Spanish liberals and argued that if they had “more faith in their ideals”, the “modern ideas” of Catholics missionaries would not “be asphyxiated upon touching the shores of Manila.” (Claudio, 2017).
The country has continuously swung from autocratic to reformist leaders. The downfall of Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorship in 1986 was spearheaded by a revolution of the people. A bloodless demonstration, in which thousands of Filipinos gathered on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue for three days to protest the late president, Marcos and concluded that enough was enough. But we must do well to remember that these are the same Filipinos who voted Duterte to the highest office of the land. To move forward, we must acknowledge these contradictions and not infantilize the masses but instead recognize their decisions to be active rather than passive. Liberals must find a way to incorporate these ‘irrationalities’; to embrace the role of culture and emotions in politics, as to abandon them will result to the exploitation of others ‘for their politically nefarious ends.’ (Nolasco, 2019.) In the age of social media, where the act of listening has long been abandoned and we are so focused on being right, we must not forget the importance of questioning and introspection. Our thoughts cannot simply exist in an echo chamber, but rather we must engage with the concerns and worries of other people in better hopes of understanding them. We must seek to understand before we could be understood (Acidre, 2020). We must quit the celebration of being ‘woke’ and ‘enlightened’ and, instead redirect our focus on empowering the people.
After all, we all just want to be seen.
References
Acidre, J. (2020). Being ‘woke’ and the ‘right to listen’. Manila Standard. Retrieved from https://manilastandard.net/mobile/article/331584
Bayani, Luzviminda. (2017, May 30). Smart-shaming – isn’t this a very condescending phrase? [Quora thread]. Quora. https://www.quora.com/What-is-your-view-on-smart-shaming-in-the-Philippines/answer/Luzviminda-Bayani.
Claudio, L. (2017). Defending Liberalism in the Global South: Notes from Duterte’s Philippines. Global South, 11(2), 92–107. https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.11.2.06
Chua, E. (2017). Please, let's stop throwing around the word 'populism'. The Stanford Daily: Stanford University. https://advance-lexis-com.srv proxy2.library.tamu.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5MN6-FXV1-JBSN-346M-00000-00&context=1516831.
Curato, N., & Ong, J. (2018). Who Laughs at a Rape Joke? Illiberal Responsiveness in Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippines. Ethical Responsiveness And The Politics Of Difference, 117-132. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93958-2_7
Gatdula, J. (2016). The damage of liberal elitism to the Philippines. Foundation for Economic Freedom. Retrieved from https://www.fef.org.ph/jemy-gatdula/the-damage-of-liberal-elitism-to-the-philippines/.
Kenny, P. (2020). Why Is There No Political Polarization in the Philippines? - Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia: Old Divisions, New Dangers. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/18/why-is-there-no-political-polarization-in-philippines-pub-82439.
Nolasco, J. (2019). Why so serious: the limits of liberal democracy in the Philippines. New Mandala. Retrieved from https://www.newmandala.org/why-so-serious-the-limits-of-liberal-democracy-in-the-philippines/.
Oliveros, J. (2017, May 24). In one of my innumerable debates with my Dad… [Quora thread]. Quora. https://www.quora.com/What-is-your-view-on-smart-shaming-in-the-Philippines/answer/John-Camarines.
Regalado, P. (2021). Why the Bobotante vs Woke Divide Must Stop, for the Election's Sake. reportr. Retrieved from https://www.reportr.world/news/bobotante-woke-divide-philippine-elections-explainer-a4832-20211123.
Reyes, R. (2021). EDUCATORS SPEAK: What’s right, wrong about being ‘woke’? Business Mirror. Retrieved from https://businessmirror.com.ph/2021/05/29/educators-speak-whats-right-wrong-about-being-woke/
Sicat, G. (2019). Jose Rizal’s ideals and ideas. Per se. Retrieved from https://econ.upd.edu.ph/perse/?p=7208
Uyheng, J., & Montiel, C. (2021). Populist polarization in postcolonial Philippines: Sociolinguistic rifts in online drug war discourse. European Journal Of Social Psychology, 51(1), 84-99. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2716.
Zafra, J. (2016). Duterte is your walking, talking id.. Jessica Rules the Universe. Retrieved from http://www.jessicarulestheuniverse.com/2016/04/19/duterte-is-your-walking-talking-id/?fbclid=IwAR00x_elQRpMRQ0WSkHNUpOcD0gDm5EF-wYaPxo_eLexJDPIFzf379cW_wg.
Acidre, J. (2020). Being ‘woke’ and the ‘right to listen’. Manila Standard. Retrieved from https://manilastandard.net/mobile/article/331584
Bayani, Luzviminda. (2017, May 30). Smart-shaming – isn’t this a very condescending phrase? [Quora thread]. Quora. https://www.quora.com/What-is-your-view-on-smart-shaming-in-the-Philippines/answer/Luzviminda-Bayani.
Claudio, L. (2017). Defending Liberalism in the Global South: Notes from Duterte’s Philippines. Global South, 11(2), 92–107. https://doi.org/10.2979/globalsouth.11.2.06
Chua, E. (2017). Please, let's stop throwing around the word 'populism'. The Stanford Daily: Stanford University. https://advance-lexis-com.srv proxy2.library.tamu.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5MN6-FXV1-JBSN-346M-00000-00&context=1516831.
Curato, N., & Ong, J. (2018). Who Laughs at a Rape Joke? Illiberal Responsiveness in Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippines. Ethical Responsiveness And The Politics Of Difference, 117-132. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93958-2_7
Gatdula, J. (2016). The damage of liberal elitism to the Philippines. Foundation for Economic Freedom. Retrieved from https://www.fef.org.ph/jemy-gatdula/the-damage-of-liberal-elitism-to-the-philippines/.
Kenny, P. (2020). Why Is There No Political Polarization in the Philippines? - Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia: Old Divisions, New Dangers. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/18/why-is-there-no-political-polarization-in-philippines-pub-82439.
Nolasco, J. (2019). Why so serious: the limits of liberal democracy in the Philippines. New Mandala. Retrieved from https://www.newmandala.org/why-so-serious-the-limits-of-liberal-democracy-in-the-philippines/.
Oliveros, J. (2017, May 24). In one of my innumerable debates with my Dad… [Quora thread]. Quora. https://www.quora.com/What-is-your-view-on-smart-shaming-in-the-Philippines/answer/John-Camarines.
Regalado, P. (2021). Why the Bobotante vs Woke Divide Must Stop, for the Election's Sake. reportr. Retrieved from https://www.reportr.world/news/bobotante-woke-divide-philippine-elections-explainer-a4832-20211123.
Reyes, R. (2021). EDUCATORS SPEAK: What’s right, wrong about being ‘woke’? Business Mirror. Retrieved from https://businessmirror.com.ph/2021/05/29/educators-speak-whats-right-wrong-about-being-woke/
Sicat, G. (2019). Jose Rizal’s ideals and ideas. Per se. Retrieved from https://econ.upd.edu.ph/perse/?p=7208
Uyheng, J., & Montiel, C. (2021). Populist polarization in postcolonial Philippines: Sociolinguistic rifts in online drug war discourse. European Journal Of Social Psychology, 51(1), 84-99. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2716.
Zafra, J. (2016). Duterte is your walking, talking id.. Jessica Rules the Universe. Retrieved from http://www.jessicarulestheuniverse.com/2016/04/19/duterte-is-your-walking-talking-id/?fbclid=IwAR00x_elQRpMRQ0WSkHNUpOcD0gDm5EF-wYaPxo_eLexJDPIFzf379cW_wg.